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Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP85T00788R000100060012-5

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

APEX Industrial Security Manual

OS REGISTRY

\*FILE Security 18

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

25X1

CIA Member, APEX Industrial  
Security Manual Task Force

DATE

9 April 79

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and  
building)

DATE

OFFICER'S  
INITIALSCOMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom  
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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OS REGISTRY

FILE Security 18

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

25X1 FROM:

[REDACTED]  
CIA Member, APEX Industrial Security Manual  
Task Force

SUBJECT: APEX Industrial Security Manual

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to bring to your attention the current status of the APEX Industrial Security Manual being developed by the Community Security Group, DCI Security Committee, and to highlight serious concerns the Agency has with respect to the Manual. [REDACTED]

2. In the way of background, you will recall that in the aftermath of the Boyce/Lee espionage case, several studies were conducted of the Agency's Industrial Security Program. One by-product of those reviews was the formation of the Industrial Security Branch which was directed to prepare a series of industrial security manuals governing collateral as well as compartmented classified contracting activities within industry. These manuals were to: eliminate the lack of uniformity, loose and imprecise standards and procedures existing in the current manuals; improve the physical security standards for the protection of classified materials, whether collateral or compartmented; and incorporate approximately 20 additional general security requirements pertaining to document control, tighter personnel supervision, and other security enhancements as directed by the DCI and the Director of Security. [REDACTED]

3. In response to the above direction, "Standard Security Procedures for Contractors" (SSPC) was developed and specifically designed to supersede the "White and Green Books" currently in use by the Office of Logistics for collateral classified contracting activities. The SSPC was painstakingly prepared, widely coordinated within the Agency (and with Mr. [REDACTED] of SAFSS) and subsequently approved.

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It is now being readied for publication and dissemination. Particular care was taken to incorporate into the SSPC precise and clear-cut security procedures, improved security standards for the protection of classified material - higher in most respects than those currently in force for the protection of compartmented materials - and to introduce those general security requirements of particular concern to the DCI and the Director of Security. [ ]

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4. Once the SSPC was approved, the next step was to develop a similar manual governing compartmented information and which would be as uniform as possible with the SSPC which dealt exclusively with the collateral world. It was anticipated that the compartmented manual, once approved within the Agency, would be coordinated within the Community for eventual application Community-wide. As it turned out, however, the responsibility to prepare the compartmented version was diverted from the Industrial Security Branch and assigned to the Community Security Group, DCI Security Committee, under the latter's charge to prepare authoritative guidelines for the protection of compartmented information within Government and industry. The so-called APEX System is to be a single control system designed to replace the three current control systems under which sensitive compartmented information is currently being protected. [ ]

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5. A draft APEX Industrial Security Manual was recently circulated within the Agency for review and comment. Conspicuous among reviewer responses was that the manual lacked specificity, was vague, and absent the 20 or so security requirements mandated by the DCI and the Director of Security. Further, it was noted that the manual lacked procedural detail, could not stand alone and would beg the issuance of a host of implementing directives - probably in conflict with one another - from a multitude of Government agencies engaged in compartmented contractual activities. This would make procedural uniformity incredibly difficult if not impossible. [ ]

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6. As is apparent, the concerns expressed about the APEX draft transcend syntax and grammar. The core of the problem is the general and imprecise nature of the APEX Industrial Security Manual and that the absence of specificity will produce a lack of uniformity. In other words, if approved the APEX Industrial Security Manual essentially will bring us back to where we started. [ ]

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7. If the current draft of the APEX Industrial Security Manual is approved as written - as appears to be the case - then the Agency may want to consider preparing its own manual governing SCI, modeling it after the SSPC. Uniformity would then be achieved at least within the Agency Industrial Security arena. Such a course of action would seem permissible in view of the following provisions set forth in the APEX draft:

"This Manual is not...intended to intrude on the authority of Senior Intelligence Officers (SIO's) of the Intelligence Community who will continue to prescribe basic direction, classification guidance and policy on dissemination for programs under their cognizance.... To fulfill their responsibilities, Government officials may provide additional implementing guidance to contractors under their cognizance as necessary as long as such guidance is coordinated with the DCI Security Committee."

It is noted, too, that consideration of the above option was discussed in general terms with the Chairman, APEX Manual Working Group, who imposed no objection.

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Distribution:

Original - DD/PTOS  
1 - ISB Subject  
① - ISB Chrono

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